Ukraine Update: The next big battle carries real consequences

In the last week, Russian forces moved around the town of Selydove, south of the strategically important city of Povrosk. Ukrainian forces caught in a narrowing strip of land under attack from three directions were forced to withdraw. As of Monday, Russia has occupied much of Selydove.

Russia forces now control the critical crossroads 13 kilometers south of the Pokrovsk. At Krasnyi Yar, they are only 8 kilometers east of the city. And in the last few days, fighting has begun for the control of Lysivka, just 5 km from Pokrovsk.

It has taken Russia the better part of eight months to drive a 40 km wedge into the heart of Donetsk Oblast, but the point of that wedge has always been aimed straight at Pokrovsk. Now the conflict for control of the city is only days away.

Can Ukraine save Pokrovsk from becoming the next Bakhmut? And ... how hard should it try?

What's happening in Ukraine now is an echo of what happened last year: The failed Ukrainian counteroffensive toward the city of Tokmak.

Ukraine expended some of its best forces and ungodly amounts of ammunition in an effort that ultimately stalled after only a few kilometers. They greatly overestimated their ability to penetrate defensive lines Russia had constructed over the winter and failed to credit Russia for effectively working both drones and artillery into their defense strategy.

The losses suffered in that effort led directly to what is happening now in Donetsk.

In February, Russia wore down Ukrainian resistance in their own enormously costly four-month battle at Avdiivka. However, unlike the Ukrainian attempt, Russia was successful at breaking through. They forced Ukraine to make a significant retreat and captured the flattened rubble that remained of Avdiivka. That position allowed Russian forces to flank, isolate, and overrun defenses that had defined the edge of Russian occupation since the end of the 2014 invasion.

And the result of all that is that Russia hasn't been advancing along a single highway, or in a vulnerable salient. They've maintained a moving front better than 30 km wide through the last eight months, grinding away at Ukrainian positions—along with Ukrainian troops and Ukrainian equipment—as they reduced the area to waste village by village.

The cost to Russia has been enormous. But these last few months in Donetsk Oblast have also been costly to Ukrainian forces. Without in-place defensive positions like those that had been at Avdiivka or Vuhledar (and without the help of Russia making jaw-dropping tactical blunders like the multiple failed river crossings near Bilohorivika earlier in the war), the ratio of losses isn't nearly so lopsided.

Ukraine's fighting defense of the region southeast of Pokrovsk has been difficult and costly.

They are losing fewer men and machines than Russia, but — thanks in no small part to the failed counteroffensive in the south — Ukraine has far fewer of either to lose. Reuters reports that Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk are "vastly outnumbered," and while Ukrainian sources don't quite put it that bluntly, no one is pretending that Russia doesn't have a large numerical advantage.

The well-regarded Kara-dag unit is still reportedly in place holding the western edge of Selydove. Ukrainian units have also been able to slow Russian movements near Krasnyi Yar over the last two weeks. But the numeric difference makes it difficult, if not impossible, to hold the line at every point.

So now Russia's final push toward Pokrovsk is on. According to numerous reports, it may include North Korean troops who are reportedly being positioned in the area after being brought in using civilian vehicles (this has not been confirmed). Official reports from the Ukrainian military indicate that some North Koreans are already inside Ukraine, but don't provide their exact location.

In the last day, the hottest action was in the area south of recently occupied Hirnyk. Russians are making a series of attacks against Ukrainians positioned west of Kurakhivka. If Russia can close the gap to nearby Kurakhove, they'll be able to straighten their front and establish communication with other Russian forces to the south. That action may be completed before the final Pokrovsk push.

It's easy to see that the Battle for Pokrovsk is coming. It's also a good bet that Ukraine, knowing exactly where Russia has been heading for most of the year, is prepared for this fight. There are bluffs south of the city at Shevchenko and a trio of large hills (actually mounds of mine waste) to the east that could provide tactical advantage. The upcoming battle is also likely to see Ukraine fighting behind the combination of drones and well-salted minefields that has proven so daunting in so many locations throughout the last year of this war.

Russia will likely counter with the method that has proven most effective for them over the last few months. In addition to its usual saturation use of artillery and using drones to penetrate into the backfield, Russia has been putting one or two soldiers each in light vehicles and motorbikes, knowing that many will be killed, but counting on sheer numbers to carry the day. This tactic exhibits extraordinary disdain for the life of their troops ... but it has also been effective at several locations.

[Warning: Graphic video. Don't click through unless you're prepared.]

As the battle draws near, the question of how much effort Ukraine should put into holding Pokrovsk needs to be seriously considered. There was a lot of criticism of Ukrainian commanders, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, for the extended defense in both Severodonetsk early in the war and in Bakhmut before its eventual capture by Wagner Group mercenaries. Both of those battles started out as situations in which Russian losses wildly outstripped those of Ukraine, but the stubbornness to hold positions that seemed increasingly tenuous resulted in significant Ukrainian losses before the two cities were eventually surrendered.

Plenty of armchair generals have complained about the losses in the final days or weeks of defenses that were almost certainly hopeless. Those same critiques are likely being polished up for redeployment.

However, Pokrovsk is a strategic location — far more so than the now-demolished Bakhmut. The two things that make it most valuable are:

• It is located at the crossroads of several major highways and rail lines where it serves as a transport hub to many other areas in Donetsk Oblast.
• A large coal mine that has become more vital due to damaged infrastructure and the Russian occupation of other mining areas.

What makes that mine particularly critical is that it produces coking coal. Coking coal isn't used for energy production (it can be used that way in an emergency, but it's a huge waste). This is coal with just the right set of properties that allow it to be used to make coke. Not the kind of coke you drink. The kind that is used to turn iron into high-quality steel.

The mine west of Pokrovsk is currently the only coking coal mine left under Ukrainian control.

If the mine is captured, or Russian forces so damage the area around the mine that it can't operate and ship out coal, Ukraine will be forced to import any coke it needs for steel production. That's an economic and logistical challenge for plants that are dependent on the coal from Pokrovsk. (It's a technical challenge, as well. All coke is not the same and steel production often counts on having coal with very specific measures in some very arcane characteristics. You can't just 1 for 1 replace one coking coal for another.) If the plant closes, expect Ukraine's production of steel — steel like that used in the production and service of armored vehicles — to drop by a third.

In a war of attrition, anything that cuts into the opponent's ability to repair and replace lost units is important. Russia sees that it can wound Ukraine at Pokrovsk. That's why it's going there. And it's why this battle is about a lot more than "prestige" or "morale."

Those things are important, and they're also at stake. But Pokrovsk is vital in a very tangible way. If Ukraine keeps fighting there, even though the odds may look hopeless, don't be surprised.

Kursk

Events in Kursk continue to be a mixed bag. Neither Russia nor Ukraine appears to have significantly augmented their forces in the area this week, so it continues to be the same units (relatively small compared to the forces facing off in Donetsk) scrambling for position.

Overall, Russia has managed to reoccupy about a third of the territory Ukraine captured at the full extent of the incursion. However, there still seems to be no evidence that Ukraine is removing forces from Kursk or cycling out more experienced units.

Whatever they're trying to accomplish there, they are still trying.

Last week, we noted the Ukrainian forces that were caught at the end of a long salient at Olgovka after Russian forces moved quickly down the highway towards Novoivanovka. As expected, the Ukrainian forces stepped back rather than be cut off. However, when Russia tried to push its own salient to encircle these troops, they got slapped back quickly.

What happens next in this area is likely to be defined by which side manages to hold the village of Novoivanovka. This is near the location where videos last week showed both an Abrams tank and a Bradley fighting vehicle in action. Russia has still not captured this village despite making a relatively determined attack two weeks ago.

Russia reportedly dropped clusterbombs on Novoivanovka on Tuesday. Reminder: This is a Russian town.

Ukraine recaptured the area west of Sverdilokovo after a brief push by Russian forces, but the movement seems to have stopped about where things were a week ago. On the southeast side of the incursion around the town of Borki, Russia has been making numerous claims of advances and victories, none of which seem to have been confirmed on the ground. However, Russia did seem to turn back a Ukrainian push north of Veseloye in one of the secondary incursions to the west.

Overall, Ukraine is slowly giving up small bits of the incursion area, but is still hitting back if Russia tries to prod them too hard. Ukraine is well positioned to withdraw if it wants to. It just doesn't want to.

There have also been reports that North Korean forces are being deployed to the Kursk region. It's unclear if this is anything more than rumor.

U.S. did not promise to end limits if North Korea joins fight

A number of military accounts on social media, from Twitter to Telegram, have been reporting that the Pentagon plans to remove all limits on the use of U.S. made weapons if North Korean troops enter the fight.

However, this appears to be based on a misunderstanding of a statement from said Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh.

As Reuters reports, what was actually said was a lot less exciting.

Ukraine would not see any new restrictions on the use of U.S. weapons against North Korean forces should they enter the fight against Ukrainian forces, the Pentagon said on Monday, as it estimated 10,000 North Korean troops had been deployed to eastern Russia for training.

Note the word "new." The Pentagon isn't promising to take the gloves off. Sadly, it's just promising not to put more gloves on.